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Introduction
The effect of apartment complex location and amenities (such as square footage, number
of bedrooms, etc.) on house prices and rent has long been the subject of real estate
research (for reviews, see Benjamin and Sirmans, 1994; Jud, Benjamin and Sirmans, 1996;
and Sirmans and Benjamin, 1991). Some features have been shown to be determinants of
real estate prices and rents; the value that owners and tenants attach to other features,
however, has not uniformly been established. Of particular interest, for example, is the
effect on rent of security measures such as restricted access. This study measures the
impact of security measures on apartment rent for high-rise apartments.
While it is expected that security measures will produce a rent premium, the existence
and extent of any rent premium have yet to be conﬁrmed through empirical research.
Tenants’ preferences for security systems and controlled access are more useful to real
estate investors, property managers and community groups when the premium that
tenants are willing to pay for such security measures is known. The process of deter-
mining the premium can be complex. For example, apartments located in crime areas
that necessitate heightened security measures may realize a rent premium for the beneﬁts
of added security, but this premium may be offset by a rent discount caused by the
negatively perceived location. This study seeks to determine the effect of security
measures on apartment rent and occupancy while accounting for location. Evidence on
the impact of security measures on apartment rent and occupancy would have important
implications for investors, developers and others who hold ﬁnancial stakes in the supply
of apartment space.
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Abstract. This study examines the effect of security measures on apartment rent and
occupancy. Three variables representing various security measures are estimated in a
simultaneous model of rent and occupancy. Providing 24-hour security has a signiﬁcant
positive effect on both rent and occupancy. Having a manager living on site or a manned
front desk/restricted entry does not signiﬁcantly affect rent. All three variables, however,
have a signiﬁcant positive effect on occupancy. It would appear that, although landlords
cannot extract higher rents for some security measures, all three measures included in this
study act to increase occupancy.Information on apartment features for a set of high-rise apartments in the Washington,
D.C. metro area is used. A sample of eighty-one high-rise apartments in this Washington,
D.C. area provides 230 observations for 1992. Hedonic regressions are used to determine




Of the considerable research devoted to the determination of real estate values, some
has concentrated on the effect of location on property value. Location has long and
frequently been considered a primary determinant of real estate value. An early study in
1926 addresses the role that location plays in determining land use and rents (Pearson,
1991). Location has since been examined from various aspects. While traditional location
theory has focused on transportation costs rather than speciﬁc real estate features, often
the value of physical attributes of real estate is obscured by values that tenants or owners
attach to location and to direct property amenities. Within the complex bundle of services
and amenities included in real estate transactions, research has shown neighborhood
environment to be a key determinant in the value of the real estate package (Kain and
Quigley, 1970).
Research on urban property values has determined that factors such as zoning and
distance from the city center signiﬁcantly affect rents and/or property values (see Crecine,
Davis and Jackson, 1967; Ball, 1973; Grether and Mieszkowski, 1974; Rueter, 1973).
Several models have found that fundamental physical characteristics and location explain
more than 90% of the variation in the selling prices of properties (Miller, 1982).
Neighborhood-speciﬁc characteristics of urban housing, as shown by one study, explain
between 15% to 50% of the variation in urban housing market values (Linneman, 1980).
This study also ﬁnds that neighborhood traits may induce differential values up to 100%
across structurally identical sites.
Location choice has often been examined in terms of the trade-off between commuting
and land consumption (Wheaton, 1977). Location produces services of convenience and
exposure for the owner or tenant. Location factors such as travel time and distances as
well as neighborhood features such as proximity to schools or shopping centers have been
examined in the literature, but few studies have examined and drawn conclusions about
the impact of both location and security measures on property values or rents (see
Asabere, 1990; Colwell, Guijral and Coley, 1985; Linneman, 1980).
Property Features and Value
Research on how property values are affected by their location and property features has
sometimes produced surprising and conﬂicting results. For example, being located on a
cul-de-sac results in a 28% increase in property value. Other neighborhood traits and
neighboring nonresidential land uses, such as a nearby shopping center, have been shown
to have both negative and positive effects on property values (Asabere, 1990; Colwell 
et al., 1985). Gatzlaff and Smith (1993) ﬁnd that the development of a Miami Metrorail
weakly inﬂuenced the values of nearby residential values. When examining residential
data in New Haven, Connecticut, Grether and Mieszkoski (1980) conclude that adjacent
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an earlier study by Crecine (1967) that found no systematic evidence that residential
property values in Pittsburgh are negatively affected by adjacent nonresidential land 
uses.
Proximity to a speciﬁc land use has been shown to be a primary determinant of
property values (Rueter, 1973), although little systematic research has focused on the
identiﬁcation and measurement of economic externalities. Some studies have addressed
property features, but the existence and extent of external effects on urban property
markets is a complex issue, and many property characteristics have yet to be examined
empirically. While increased security measures may appear to result in increased rents,
this effect may only be acting as a surrogate variable for a property feature or an
environmental characteristic.
Crime and Value
Proximity to speciﬁc facilities or environments such as high crime areas can impact
apartment rents and the value of single-family homes (Colwell et al., 1985). A neighbor-
hood with a high incidence of crime may create a greater demand for security measures,
but this demand may not necessarily result in higher rents or occupancy. In residential
areas, the need for various security measures often arises with proximity to particular
facilities. Public facilities such as parks, schools, reservoirs, shopping centers, and power
plants have been found to affect property values to some degree. One study concludes
that there are two contrasting elements of the inﬂuence that a public facility has on
residential housing prices: accessibility, which positively inﬂuences prices, and the visual
or noise effect based upon proximity to the facility, which negatively inﬂuences prices
(Miller, 1982).
Characteristics of real estate and location choice are of growing concern to property
owners. As crime and other factors become popular public policy issues, property owners
are confronted with determining the effect on rent and occupancy of parks, bodies of
water, crime-prone areas, etc. For the period 1981–94, there was an average, by state, of
516 violent crimes in the U.S.  North Dakota had the lowest average at 47 while
Washington, D.C. had the highest average at 2,922 (Feinberg, 1996). Over the same
period, the average number of property crimes by state was 4,594 with West Virginia
having the lowest at 2,053 and Washington, D.C. having the highest at 8,839 (Feinberg,
1996). As shown by previous research, crime does have an effect on property values.
Diamond and Tolley (1982) discuss the importance of public safety along with amenities
such as schools and culture. Burnell (1988) as well ﬁnds that housing values are adversely
affected by crime rates. Nevertheless, existing academic studies are silent on the
interaction of security measures with apartment rent and occupancy.
Empirical Model and Data
To determine the effect of security measures on apartment rent and occupancy, a hedonic
model is estimated based upon July 1992 apartment rents for 230 rent observations from
eighty-one apartment complexes in the Washington, D.C. area.1 A rent equation is
estimated in a simultaneous model with occupancy. Summary statistics for the variables
included in the model are given in Exhibit 1.
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Rent is speciﬁed with the following model:
RENTi5r(OCCi, SECURITYij, PHYij, AMENij, MGTij, LOCi) ,
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Exhibit 1
Summary Statistics for Washington, D.C. Apartment Data
Variables Mean Std Dev. Min. Max.
Rent
Rent 812 311 404 2375
ln Rent 6.64 0.33 6.00 7.77
Occupancy
Occupancy Rate 95 4.70 80 100
ln Occupancy Rate 4.60 0.05 4.38 4.61
Security Variables
24-Hour Security 0.79 0.00 1.00
Manager Lives on Site 0.84 0.00 1.00
Front Desk/Restrict. Entry 0.66 0.00 1.00
Physical Characteristics
No. of Bedrooms 1.19 0.66 0.50 3.00
No. of Bathrooms 1.15 0.35 1.00 2.00
Size of Complex 250 179 57 795
Distance to Metro 1.17 1.09 0.00 5.00
Amenities
Utilities Included in Rent 0.67 0.00 1.00
Modern Kitchen 0.61 0.00 1.00
Parking Available 0.91 0.00 1.00
Fireplace 0.13 0.00 1.00
W/D in Unit 0.11 0.00 1.00
Cable TV 0.91 0.00 1.00
No Pets Allowed 0.59 0.00 1.00
Mgmt Characteristics
Rent Deposit Required 0.66 0.00 1.00
Cosign Required for Student 0.89 0.00 1.00
Manager/Owner 0.88 0.00 1.00
Max. Occupancy 2.36 1.02 1.00 6.00
Sublet with Permission 0.54 0.00 1.00
Location Variables
Z20001 0.04 0.00 1.00
Z20005 0.08 0.00 1.00
Z20007 0.05 0.00 1.00
Z20008 0.23 0.00 1.00
Z20009 0.14 0.00 1.00
Z20016 0.08 0.00 1.00
Z20036 0.06 0.00 1.00
Z22201 0.04 0.00 1.00
Other Zip Codes* 0.28
n5206
*The Other Zip Codes variable is a cumulation of zip codes where less than 3% of the
observations in the sample come from each area.where:
RENTi5the observed monthly rent on the ith apartment unit.
OCCi5the occupancy rate for the apartment complex as a percentage
of total units in the complex.
SECURITYij5three variables identifying the security measures for the ith
apartment. These are:
a 0–1 variable indicating whether the complex has 24 hour
security;
a 0–1 variable indicating whether the complex has a manager
who lives on site; and
a 0–1 variable indicating whether the complex has a front desk
operator and/or restricted entry.
PHYij5a set of j physical characteristics for the ith apartment including:
the number of bedrooms (efﬁciency, one, two, and three
bedrooms);
the number of bathrooms (full and half-bath); and
the distance to the closest metrorail station (in tenths of miles).
AMENij5a set of j amenities for the ith apartment building:
0–1 dummy variable for parking available;
0–1 dummy variable for ﬁreplace;
0–1 dummy variable for washer/dryer in unit; and
0–1 dummy variable for no pets allowed.
MGTij5a management characteristic variable for the ith apartment:
0–1 dummy variable requirement of rent deposit.
LOCi5a set of location variables identifying the ith apartment by zip
code.
Occupancy. The relationship between rent and occupancy is unclear. In a market of
high or excess demand (a surplus of tenants), demand (occupancy) should drive rent and
a positive relationship would result.2 If occupancy is a function of rent (as in a market of
excess supply), however, there would be an inverse relationship between rent and
occupancy.
Security. The security measures represent three aspects of security: providing 24-hour
security, having a manager living on site, and having a manned front desk/restricted entry.
If tenants are willing to pay a rent premium for these various aspects of security, a
positive coefﬁcient should be observed for each variable.3 Also, if a more secured environ-
ment increases demand for apartments, a positive effect on rent would result. On the
other hand, if tenants are not willing to pay for these services but simply require them as
a condition of occupancy, the variables would have no signiﬁcant effect on  rent.
Physical Characteristics. The number of bedrooms acts as a proxy for apartment unit
size. Since rent should increase with size, the coefﬁcient is expected to be positive.
Likewise, a positive relationship is expected between rent and number of bathrooms.
Closer proximity to metrorail stations is expected to result in higher rent.
Amenities. The coefﬁcients for parking available, ﬁreplace and washer/dryer are
expected to be positive. The effect of the variable no pets allowed is less clear. A negative
coefﬁcient would be observed if renters are willing to pay a premium to keep pets on the
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owning tenants, the relationship could be positive.
Management Characteristics. The requirement of a rent deposit expressed as a
percentage of monthly rent is expected to have a negative effect on rent.
Location. The location zip code variables are used to account for location inﬂuences;
their coefﬁcients will depend on the relative desirability of the area.
The Occupancy Equation
Occupancy is speciﬁed as the following:
OCCUPANCYi5o(RENTi, SECURITYij, PHYij, AMENij, MGTij, LOCi) ,
where:
RENTi5the observed monthly rent on the ith apartment unit.
SECURITYij5a set of j security variables for the ith apartment. These are the
same as those included in the rent equation.
PHYij5a set of j physical characteristics for the ith apartment building.
These include:
the number of total units in the complex; and
the distance to the closest metrorail station (in tenths of miles).
AMENij5a set of j amenities for the apartment i. These include:
0–1 dummy variable for utilities included in rent;
0–1 dummy variable for modern (updated) kitchen;
0–1 dummy variable for ﬁreplace; and
0–1 dummy variable for cable tv.
MGTij5a set of management characteristic variables for the ith apart-
ment. These include:
0–1 dummy variable for requirement of a rent deposit;
0–1 dummy variable for required student cosigning;
0–1 dummy variable for owner/managed;
0–1 dummy variable maximum unit occupancy; and
0–1 dummy variable for subletting with permission.
LOCi5a set of location variables identifying the ith apartment by zip
code.
Results
The model is estimated in semilog form with the results for the rent equation presented in
Exhibit 2. To account for the likely simultaneity between rent and occupancy, the rent
equation is estimated with OLS, two-stage least squares (2SLS), and three-stage least
squares (3SLS) methodologies. The results for the occupancy equation are given in
Exhibit 3.4
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Exhibit 2
Regression Results for Rent Equation for Washington, D.C. 
High-Rise Apartments
(Dependent Variable5ln Rent)
Variables OLS 2SLS 3SLS
Intercept 3.224 2.657 3.495
(2.68)*** (2.00)** (2.64)***
Occupancy
ln Occupancy Rate 0.622 0.746 0.561
(2.35)** (2.56)** (1.93)*
Security Variables
24-Hour Security 0.111 0.114 0.113
(2.54)** (2.64)*** (2.60)***
Manager Lives on Site 20.012 20.008 20.012
(20.28) (20.19) (20.27)
Front Desk/Restrict. Entry 0.016 0.015 0.020
(0.48) (0.43) (0.60)
Physical Characteristics
No. of Bedrooms 0.264 0.267 0.265
(11.57)*** (11.61)*** (11.53)***
No. of Bathrooms 0.109 0.105 0.108
(2.53)** (2.41)** (2.49)**
Distance to Metro 20.068 20.070 20.070
(24.40)*** (24.55)*** (24.50)***
Amenities
Parking Available 0.141 0.143 0.149
(2.75)*** (2.78)*** (2.90)***
Fireplace 0.076 0.077 0.084
(1.43) (1.45) (1.60)
W/D in Unit 0.336 0.338 0.332
(6.95)*** (7.00)*** (6.88)***
No Pets Allowed 20.087 20.090 20.079
(22.35)** (22.44)** (22.14)**
Mgmt Characteristics
Rent Deposit Required 20.125 20.124 20.133
(22.87)*** (22.84)*** (23.05)***
Location Variables
Z20001 20.218 20.215 20.211
(23.27)*** (23.22)*** (23.18)***
Z20007 0.262 0.271 0.253
(4.10)*** (4.20)*** (3.93)***
Z20008 0.202 0.202 0.198
(5.53)*** (5.51)*** (5.43)***
Z20016 0.309 0.311 0.310
(5.44)*** (5.47)*** (5.46)***
Z20036 0.451 0.459 0.452
(7.90)*** (8.03)*** (7.91)***
Z22201 20.133 20.139 20.125
(21.72)* (21.78)* (21.61)*
R2 0.75 0.75 0.72
n 206 206 206
t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.354 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 3
Regression Results for Occupancy Equation for Washington, D.C. 
High-Rise Apartments
(Dependent Variable5ln Occupancy Rate)
Variables OLS 2SLS 3SLS
Intercept 4.547 4.771 4.799
(61.65)*** (45.94)*** (46.35)***
Rent
ln Rent per Unit 20.017 20.054 20.059
(21.48) (23.24)*** (23.51)***
Security Variables
24-Hour Security 0.031 0.033 0.033
(3.27)*** (3.40)*** (3.67)***
Manager Lives on Site 0.023 0.024 0.024
(2.57)** (2.54)** (2.54)**
Front Desk/Restrict. Entry 0.020 0.025 0.026
(2.37)** (2.87)*** (3.00)***
Physical Characteristics
Size of Complex 20.000 20.000 20.000
(22.05)* (22.65)*** (22.69)***
Distance to Metrorail 20.006 20.006 20.006
(21.83)* (21.67)* (21.66)*
Amenities
Utilities Included in Rent 0.055 0.059 0.059
(7.19)*** (7.36)*** (7.35)***
Modern Kitchen 0.018 0.022 0.022
(2.45)** (2.94)*** (2.94)***
Fireplace 0.038 0.045 0.045
(3.49)*** (3.91)*** (3.98)***
Cable TV 0.056 0.056 0.053
(4.68)*** (4.49)*** (4.30)***
Mgmt Characteristics
Rent Deposit Required 20.039 20.039 20.039
(24.64)*** (24.46)*** (24.43)***
Cosign Required for Student 0.032 0.040 0.041
(3.42)*** (3.98)*** (4.05)***
Owner/Managed 20.036 20.044 20.045
(23.80)*** (24.35)*** (24.52)***
Max. Unit Occupancy 0.003 0.010 0.010
(0.82) (3.39)*** (2.57)**
Sublet with Permission 0.010 0.013 0.014
(1.47) (1.90)* (2.07)**
Location Variables
Z20005 0.004 20.010 20.011
(0.36) (20.74) (20.86)
Z20007 20.125 20.119 20.118
(210.22)*** (29.40)*** (29.29)***
Z20009 20.038 20.047 20.048
(23.55)*** (24.09)*** (24.21)***
Z20036 20.030 20.036 20.037
(22.32)** (22.74)*** (22.78)***
Z22201 0.026 0.021 0.020
(1.62)* (1.27) (1.22)
R2 0.56 0.55 0.72
n 206 206 206
t-statistics in parentheses; ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively.Results for the Rent Equation
For the rent equation, the variables generally behave as expected, shown in Exhibit 2. The
positive effect of occupancy in all three estimations seems to indicate a market of strong
demand. All the physical characteristics are signiﬁcant with the correct sign in all esti-
mations. The amenities are generally signiﬁcant with the correct sign. The exception is
ﬁreplace which is not signiﬁcant. The negative sign on no pets allowed indicates that
tenants seem to be willing to pay higher rents to be allowed to keep animals.
The signiﬁcance of the rent deposit required with a negative sign indicates that rents are
less, on average, for those units that require a deposit.
The location variables are signiﬁcant with varying signs.
The variables of interest are the security measures. Only one of the three variables is
signiﬁcant. The positive sign for 24-hour security indicates that, on average, rents are
higher for those units that provide 24-hour security. Having a manager living on site or
having a manned front desk and/or restricted entry does not have a signiﬁcant effect on
rent.
Results for the Occupancy Equation
Results for the occupancy equation, given in Exhibit 3, show that variables in the model
behave generally as expected. The rent variable has a negative effect on occupancy.
(Recall that the coefﬁcient on occupancy in the rent equation is positive.) Taken together,
these ﬁndings seem to imply that, as occupancy increases with increased demand, land-
lords raise rents. Tenants, in turn, seem to be rent-sensitive since occupancy is lower for
apartments with higher relative rents. Occupancy declines as the size of the complex
increases. Also, occupancy decreases with distance from a metrorail station. All the
amenities variables are signiﬁcant with the expected positive effect on occupancy.
The management characteristic variables show that requiring a rent deposit has a
negative effect on occupancy. Being an owner/manager also tends to reduce occupancy.
On the other hand, three other variables—requiring a cosign for students, restricting the
number of occupants per unit, and allowing subleasing—all increase occupancy.
Some of the location variables are signiﬁcant with varying signs and coefﬁcients.
The security measures variables produce some interesting results. In the rent equation,
only 24-hour security is signiﬁcant, but in the occupancy equation all three security
variables have a signiﬁcant positive effect on occupancy. The 24-hour security variable has
the largest coefﬁcient and thus the greatest effect on occupancy. To a lesser degree, having
a manager on site and having a manned front desk and/or restricted entry also increase
occupancy.
Overall, these results provide some interesting insight into the effect of security
measures on the apartment market. First, the presence of 24-hour security seems to
increase demand for apartments and to produce higher market rents. On the other hand,
the presence of a manager on site and having a manned front desk/restricted entry do not
signiﬁcantly affect rent. Second, occupancy for those apartment complexes that provide
24-hour security is higher, on average, than for those that do not. Also, having a manager
living on site and having restricted entry either by a manned front desk or locked
doorways increase occupancy. Thus it would appear that, even though landlords cannot
capture higher rents for providing some security services, they can increase occupancy by
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increased revenues and higher property values.
Summary
This study has examined the effect of the various security measures on apartment rent
and occupancy. Using a sample of apartment complexes from the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area, a simultaneous model of rent and occupancy is estimated with three
security measures variables included. The results show that providing 24-hour security
has a positive effect on both rent per unit and occupancy. Providing a manager living on
site and having a front desk/restricted entry, however, do not have a signiﬁcant effect on
rent. Increased occupancy occurs with provision of 24-hour security, an on-site manager,
and front desk/restricted entry. Thus it appears that, although providing some security is
a prerequisite for residency, the landlord cannot extract higher rents. Providing these
security measures, however, does increase occupancy.
Notes
1The apartment complexes were located in northwest Washington, D.C. or the adjoining Maryland
and Virginia suburbs. Crime statistics revealed slightly higher rates for Washington, D.C., but
otherwise the neighborhoods are fairly homogeneous. The use of zip code dummy variables
captures differences in crime rates between neighborhoods.
2As an astute reviewer points out, this relationship can exist only until full occupancy is reached. In
this view, excess demand should drive occupancy to full capacity and then into a rent-inﬂationary
period with no change in occupancy until a new rent equilibrium is attained. Once occupancy
equals supply and the independent variable cannot increase, a positive rent/occupancy curve
cannot exist.
3No attempt is made to determine whether the expenses of security measures are being priced into
rent. However, our results show the relative importance of security measures in determining rent
and occupancy. We have no measures of the costs of providing security so as to examine the cost
side of the equation. Thus we cannot answer the question of whether security features increase
building revenue sufﬁciently to cover the expenses associated with security feature installation and
maintenance. It may be logical to assume that, if providing security features is not revenue
enhancing, then it is at least cost minimizing.
4Tests for multicollinearity yielded no indication of its presence in either equation. Due to the large
number of variables, an initial stepwise regression is used to specify both the rent and occupancy
equations. In the three-stage least squares estimation, the equations are “stacked” and GLS is
applied to the system as a whole. The parameters of all equations are then estimated simultaneously
using all the information in the model. A 3SLS system assumes non-zero correlations between the
disturbance terms across the equations. If this is the case, the 3SLS estimators will be more efﬁcient
than those obtained by OLS. By contrast, 2SLS involves regressing each endogenous variable on
the exogenous or instrumental variables of the system and using the predicted values to estimate
the structural equation of the model. The predicted values of the instrumental variables have non-
zero correlations with the disturbance terms.
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